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Lugosi v. Universal Pictures: Descent
of the Right of Publicity
The exploitation of famous names and likenesses in the promo-
tion and marketing of consumer goods has become an integral part
of American merchandising.
Licensing - the business of using famous names, tiles, slogans,
logos, cartoon characters and whatever to sell dolls, T-shirts, lunch
boxes, brassieres, wastebaskets and what-have-you - is flourishing.
Born maybe 50 years ago as an incidental thought, licensing has
emerged as a full-blown industry that has estimated annual royal-
ties of $20 million to $30 million and that is responsible for the
sale of hundreds of millions of dollars of manufactured items each
year.'
Many courts have responded to this phenomenon by providing celeb-
rities with an exclusive right to the pecuniary value of their names
and likenesses. This right is generally referred to as the "right of
publicity."2
The ultimate contours of the right of publicity are as yet unclear.
A California case, Lugosi v. Universal Pictures,4 has raised the question
of whether a right of publicity should descend to heirs. The trial
court held that the right was descendible, but the decision was reversed
on appeal. The case is presently before the California Supreme Court.
This Note will discuss the descendibility of the right of publicity.
An overview of the historical protection of name and likeness under
the right of privacy and subsequent development of the right of pub-
licity will provide a foundation for analysis of the descent issue. The
1. Connor, The Licensing of Famous Names to Sell Products is a Booming Field
These Days, Wall St. J., Dec. 2, 1974, at 34, col. 1. See Ninumer, The Right of Pub-
licity, 19 LAw & CONTEnM. PROB. 203, 203-04 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Nimmerl.
One entrepreneur expects to gross $10 million in 1977 through exploitation of the name
and likeness of the late Elvis Presley. PEoPL, Oct. 10, 1977, at 28, 31.
2. This term was coined by Judge Jerome Frank in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v.
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816
(1953). See Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d 1, 6,
294 N.Y.S.2d 122, 129 (Sup. Ct. 1968), aff'd mem., 32 App. Div. 2d 892, 301 N.Y.S.2d
948 (App. Div. 1969) (defining the "right of publicity").
3. One court complained that "[tihe state of the law is still that of a haystack
in a hurricane ...... Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481,
485 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956).
4. 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 541 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972), re'd, 70 Cal. App. 3d 552,
modified, 71 Cal. App. 3d 1027a, as modified, 139 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1977), petition for
hearing granted, Civil No. L.A. 30824 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Aug. 11, 1977).
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trial court and appellate court adjudications of the descent issue in
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures and a contrasting analysis by a New York
federal district court in Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc.5 will then be
examined. Rationales for the descent of the right will be advanced,
and the relationship between the right of publicity and society's in-
terest in the free dissemination of information and ideas will be dis-
cussed. The Note will conclude that the California Supreme Court
should find the right of publicity to be descendible and will propose
that the legislature set a statutory limit on the duration of descent.
Protection of Name and Likeness: Privacy v. Publicity
Evolution in the Right of Privacy
The historical protection of name and likeness under the law of
privacy has generated much of the confusion surrounding the issue
of descent of the right of publicity. An analysis of the descent ques-
tion must therefore begin with an overview of this historical protection.
The source of the confusion is the failure of many courts to distinguish
between the privacy interest in freedom from injury to feelings and
a celebrity's publicity interest in the pecuniary value of his or her
name and likeness. As a result, the general rule that the right of
privacy is personal and may not be assigned or inherited 6 has been
applied inappropriately to protection of a celebrity's right of publicity.
The purpose of the right of privacy expounded by Warren and
Brandeis in their celebrated 1890 law review article7 was protection
of the general "right to be let alone" by preventing public scrutiny
of thoughts, sentiments, and emotions.8 Warren and Brandeis were
concerned with abuses such as offensive newspaper gossip columns
rather than with the appropriation of an individual's name or likeness.9
Early twentieth century developments provided protection to name
5. 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
6. E.g., Young v. That Was The Week That Was, 423 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1970);
Kelly v. Johnson Publishing Co., 160 Cal. App. 2d 718, 325 P.2d 659 (1958); Schuyler
v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22 (1895); Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAJiF. L. REv. 383,
408 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Prosser]. Statutes in three states, however, provide
for descent of the right of privacy to next of kin, heirs, or personal representatives.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 839.1-.3 (West Supp. 1977-78); UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-9-406 (Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 8-650 (1957); cf. Pavesich v. New England Life
Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 210-11, 50 S.E. 68, 76 (1905) (dicta disavowing adoption of
the "personal" limitation on the right of privacy).
7. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAsv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
8. Id. at 205.
9. Id. at 196; see Prosser, supra note 6, at 401; Comment, Commercial Appro-
priation of an Individual's Name, Photograph or Likeness: A New Remedy for Cali-
fornians, 3 PAC. L.J. 651 (1972) [hereinafter cited as New Remedy for Californians].
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and likeness as an extension of the law of privacy. At that time, when
the business of licensing and exploiting famous names and likenesses
was embryonic, the significance of an exclusive right to name and like-
ness was considered primarily within the context of emotional harm.
The 1899 case of Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co.10 is illustrative.
In that case the defendant had appropriated the name and likeness
of the plaintiff's deceased husband, a well known lawyer and politician,
for use in marketing cigars. The plaintiff did not allege pecuniary
harm, nor did the court discuss any financial implications of the appro-
priation. The court stated that neither the plaintiff nor her husband,
were he alive, had a remedy; the pecuniary value of the deceased's
name and likeness was not treated as relevant to the disposition of
the case.
Because legislatures and courts seeking to protect name and like-
ness from appropriation perceived the wrong only as an invasion of
the right to be let alone, name and likeness were protected under the
developing right of privacy. The most significant early extension of
such legal protection followed the 1902 refusal of the New York Court
of Appeals to protect a plaintiff from use of her picture to advertise
flour." The New York legislature responded by designating the ap-
propriation of name or likeness "for advertising purposes, or for the
purposes of trade" as an invasion of the right of privacy.12  Subsequent
legislative 13 and judicial l action in other jurisdictions similarly sought
to protect "[t]he right to withdraw from the public gaze at such times
as a person may see fit."' 5 Protection against appropriation of name
and likeness became firmly entrenched in the law of privacy.'"
Victims of appropriation consequently have sued for invasion of
privacy even when their real complaint was that they were not com-
10. 121 Mich. 372, 80 N.W. 285 (1899).
11. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
12. 1903 N.Y. LAws, ch. 132, §§ 1-2 (current version at N.Y. Crv. BIGHTs LAw
§§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1976)).
13. Statutes similar to the New York privacy statute were later enacted in Okla-
homa, Utah, and Virginia. They differ from the New York statute, however, in that
they provide for descent of the right of privacy to next of kin, heirs, or personal rep-
resentatives. See note 6 supra. In 1971 the California legislature codified the "right
of privacy" protection of name and likeness, prohibiting appropriation "for purposes
of advertising ...or ...solicitation." CAL. Civ. CoDs § 3344 (West Supp. 1977);
see Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 43 Cal. App. 3d 880, 894, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 370, 381 (1974).
14. See Annot., 23 A.L.R.3d 865 (1969).
15. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 196, 50 S.E. 68, 70
(1905).
16. Dean Prosser isolated four distinct types of privacy invasion: intrusion upon
seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, false light in the public eye, and appro-
priation of name or likeness. Prosser, supra note 6, at 389.
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pensated for the pecuniary value of their names and likenesses. 17 An
example of such misstatement of the cause of action is seen in O'Brien
v. Pabst Sales Co.,' 8 in which a photograph of the plaintiff, a football
player, was appropriated by the defendant and printed on calendars.
The athlete sued for invasion of his privacy. The court declared that
the plaintiff had no cause of action because he was only getting the
publicity that public figures constantly seek.19 A dissenting opinion
pointed out, however, that the athlete had essentially sought to recover
for the pecuniary value of his likeness but had pleaded the wrong
theory.
20
The insufficiency of the privacy theory for protection from pecu-
niary wrongs became more apparent as the commercial use of famous
names and likenesses increased.21  The sine qua non of invasion of
privacy is injury to feelings through denial of the right to be let alone;
this injury may be absent in the case of a celebrity who seeks publicity,
so that the law of privacy logically should afford no relief.22 Even
when a celebrity is successful under a privacy theory, recovery will
be limited by the rule of damages for invasion of privacy, which com-
pensates for injury to feelings rather than for the pecuniary value of
the use. 23  When the interest in name and likeness is financial, the
concept that the right of privacy is personal24 imposes an artificial
limitation. The basis for so limiting the right of privacy, the personal
nature of the right to be let alone, is irrelevant to the proposal that
exclusive rights to the pecuniary value of a famous name or likeness
should descend to heirs.
17. This problem has been thoroughly examined in Gordon, Right of Property in
Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 553 (1960) [hereinafter
cited as Gordon].
18. 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941).
19. Id. at 170. Another court similarly noted, "Professional privacy is . . . the
very antithesis of the [baseball] player's need and goal." Spahn v. Julian Messner,
Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324, 327, 332 N.E.2d 543, 544, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877, 878 (1966), vacated
per curiam, 387 U.S. 239, aff'd on rehearing, 21 N.Y.2d 124, 233 N.E.2d 840, 286
N.Y.S.2d 832 (1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 1046 (1969).
20. 124 F.2d at 170-71. Accord, Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N.Y. 354,
361-62, 107 N.E.2d 485, 489-90 (1952) (concurring opinion) (action for invasion of
privacy in broadcasting plaintiff's trained animal performance; real injury was non-
payment).
21. See text accompanying note I supra.
22. See, e.g., Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d
866, 868 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124
F.2d 167, 170-71 (5th Cir. 1942) (dissenting opinion).
23. Nimmer, supra note 1, at 208. See, e.g., Fairfield v. American Photocopy
Equipment Co., 158 Cal. App. 2d 53, 322 P.2d 93 (1958) (compensation for worry
and humiliation caused by invasion of privacy).
24. See note 6 & accompanying text supra.
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Distinguishing a Right of Publicity
As the inadequacy of the law of privacy as protection for the
pecuniary value of famous names and likenesses became clear, courts
sought to distinguish the interests that could be invaded by an ap-
propriation so that each could be afforded suitable protection. 25  Two
distinct interests, emotional and financial, were recognized in the 1953
case of Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.2 6 In
Haelan the plaintiff had acquired from a baseball player the exclusive
right to use a photograph of the athlete in the sale of chewing gum.
The ballplayer subsequently granted the same right to the defendant,
a rival chewing gum manufacturer, and the lawsuit ensued. The de-
fense challenged the plaintiff's claim of an exclusive right to the photo-
graph by pointing out that the right of privacy is not assignable.27  The
court nevertheless held for the plaintiff, finding that the athlete had
assigned a right that was separate and distinct from the right of
privacy. Judge Jerome Frank explained the court's reasoning:
We think that, in addition to and independent of [the] right of
privacy . . . a man has a right in the publicity value of his photo-
graph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishin,
his picture, and that such a right may validly be made "in gross,
i.e., without an accompanying transfer of a business or of any-
thing else....
This right might be called a "right of publicity." For it is
common knowledge that many prominent persons (especially
actors and ball-players), far from having their feelings bruised
through public exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely de-
prived if they no longer received money for authorizing advertise-
ments, popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers,
magazines, busses, trains and subways.28
A precise explanation of the two separate interests in name and
likeness appeared in a 1957 case, Hogan v. A. S. Barnes & Co. 2 9  In
that case the defendant had published a book that contained a picture
of the famous golfer, Ben Hogan, along with textual material purport-
ing to reveal some of his secrets to success in his sport. One of the
causes of action alleged by Hogan was for invasion of privacy. The
court stated that, although appropriation of name or likeness has been
25. An early example of such efforts is the dissenting opinion in O'Brien v. Pabst
Sales Co.. See note 20 & accompanying text supra.
26. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
27. Id. at 867; see Prosser, supra note 6, at 408.
28. 202 F.2d at 868. A number of cases have reached similar conclusions. See,
e.g., Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974);
Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969); Ettore v. Philco Television
Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956);
Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970).
29. 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 314 (Pa. C.P. 1957).
called an invasion of privacy, it actually involves one of two distinct
wrongs. If a plaintiff had been unknown to the general public, the
essence of his complaint would be invasion of privacy through exposure
to unwanted publicity. If he were a public figure, the essence of his
cause of action would be the lack of compensation for the commercial
value of his name or likeness. 30  The court held for Hogan on the
basis of the latter.
31
A plaintiff's status as a celebrity does not necessarily determine
that the right of publicity, rather than the right to privacy, is being
asserted. The possibility exists that the appropriation of a celebrity's
name or likeness may actually cause injury to feelings.3 2 An illustra-
30. Id. at 315-16; see Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d
481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956); New Remedy for Californians, supra
note 9, at 656-57. But cf. Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn.
1970) (stating that appropriation cases generally involve a claim for pecuniary loss and
are distinct from Prosser's other three types of privacy invasion).
31. Hogan also declared that the protection of a right of publicity is "but another
way of applying the doctrine of unfair competition." 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 320;
see Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 493-94 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956) (speculating that New York courts would use the
law of unfair competition to protect valuable names and likenesses). This notion is
based upon the idea that a name or likeness may acquire "secondary meaning" for
publicity purposes. A word or phrase acquires secondary meaning when it is "used
so long and so exclusively by one producer with reference to his article that . . . the
word or phrase had come to mean that the article was his product." G. & C. Merriam
Co. v. Saalfield, 198 F. 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1912), modified and aff'd, 238 F. 1 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 243 U.S. 651 (1917). The law of unfair competition protects
such words or phrases from imitation by another "producer" when the use is likely
to result in deception as to the origin of the imitator's product. 7 B. WITIN, SUMMARY
OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Equity, 5294 (8th ed. 1974). In the publicity context a name or
likeness may be said to acquire "secondary meaning" when a person's achievements (i.e.,
"product") are so widely recognized that they become synonymous with his or her
name and likeness. The Hogan court essentially viewed the appropriation in that case
as unfair competition through deceptive exploitation of the secondary meaning in the
plaintiff's name. The approach worked well enough, but this result may be attributed
to the fact that Hogan himself had written extensively on golf, so that the defendant's
publication was in competition with Hogan's publications. Professor Nimmer has sug-
gested that the doctrine will afford no relief when there is an absence of "palming off"
(defendant's passing off his or her goods as those of the plaintiff) or when the plaintiff
is not engaged in a competitive business. Nimmer, supra note 1, at 210-13. The
modern trend in the law of unfair competition has been toward relaxation of the com-
petition and passing off requirements (see 7 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA
LAW, Equity, 5300-03 (8th ed. 1974), but the doctrine will still provide no relief
unless the plaintiff has commercially exploited his or her name or likeness. See notes
93-95 & accompanying text infra. The law of unfair competition is thus inadequate
for protecting the right of publicity and has rarely been used for that purpose.
32. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 824-25 n.11
(9th Cir. 1974) (dictum). Conversely, persons not known to the general public may
assert a right of publicity. Professor Nimmer has stated that "[it is impractical to
attempt to draw a line as to which persons have achieved the status of celebrity and
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tive case is Grant v. Esquire, Inc.,33 in which actor Cary Grant sued
for use of his likeness in a magazine article on new clothing styles.
Grant claimed that he wanted no one, including himself, to secure
the financial benefits of this sort of publicity, which he apparently
found offensive.a4  The court held that he had stated a cause of ac-
tion for invasion of privacy under the New York privacy statute and,
additionally, could recover damages for the pecuniary value of the
exploitation.8 5
Most courts that have expressly or implicitly extended legal pro-
tection to the right of publicity have rationalized this action by char-
acterizing the interest in the pecuniary value of a famous name or
likeness as a "property" right.36  As one judge observed, "[T]he word
of power most frequently employed by the courts is either 'privacy'
or 'property' . . . .,,7 The privacy label signifies protection of the
interest in being let alone; the property label denotes protection of
the interest in the pecuniary value of a famous name or likeness.
The property rationale is based upon the concept that "[t]he term
'property' . .. extends to every species of right and interest capable
of being enjoyed as such upon which it is practicable to place a
money value." 8  It is practicable, and common in the business com-
which have not; it should rather be held that every person has the property right of
publicity, but that the damages which a person may claim for infringement of the right
will depend upon the value of the publicity appropriated which in turn will depend in
great measure upon the degree of fame attained by the plaintiff." Nimmer, supra note
1, at 217. A rule of compensation based upon the value of the appropriated name or
likeness will thus circumvent specious right of publicity claims.
33. 367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
34. Id. at 880.
35. Id. at 880-81. But see Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 221, 20 S.2d 243, 254
(1944) (contradictory to seek both damages for injury to feelings and a share of
profits from the use that caused injury).
36. See, e.g., Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205, 1206 (8th Cir. 1969); Ettore
v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 487 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 926 (1956); O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1941)
(dissenting opinion); Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co., 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 314, 320
(Pa. C.P. 1957); Gordon, supra note 17, at 553-55, 605-13 (extensive argument favor-
ing return to the property protection from which Warren and Brandeis had removed
the right of privacy). One commentator has suggested that California Civil Code §
3344, which provides minimum damages of $300 for appropriation of name or likeness,
in effect bestows a "property right" upon all persons. New Remedy for Californians,
supra note 9, at 663.
37. Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 486 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956). A footnote indicated that the court was "[ulsing
the word 'power' in its magical or talismanic sense." Id. at 486 n.8.
38. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 826 n.14 (9th
Cir. 1974) (quoting Yuba River Power Co. v. Nevada Irrigation Dist., 207 Cal. 521,
523, 279 P. 128, 129 (1929)).
munity, to place a money value on a famous name or likeness,39
which may therefore be conceived of as "property."40
Several authorities, on the other hand, have discouraged reliance
on the property label to explain the right of publicity. Judge Frank
declared in Haelan that "[w]hether it be labelled a 'property' right is
immaterial; for here, as often elsewhere, the tag 'property' simply
symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim which has pecuniary
worth."41 Dean Prosser similarly minimized the importance of the
label.42 The property label itself is without independent substance;
it merely indicates that courts recognize a pecuniary right of public-
ity.43  Nevertheless, the label is relied upon by most courts,44 so that,
not surprisingly, it appears in the controversy over descent of the right
of publicity.
45
In sum, there is a strong trend toward protecting the right of
publicity. Assertions of the right in California, however, have been
litigated infrequently.46 Nevertheless, in a recent federal case in
which a photograph of a professional race car driver's automobile was
appropriated for use in a cigarette advertisement,4 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit declared:
So far as we can determine, California has no case in point;
the state's appropriation cases uniformly appear to have involved
only the "injury to personal feelings" aspect of the tort. Never-
theless, from our review of the relevant authorities, we conclude
that the California appellate courts would, in a case such as this
one, afford legal protection to an individual's proprietary interest
in his own identity. We need not decide whether they would do
so under the rubric of "privacy," "property," or "publicity"; we
39. See note 106 & accompanying text infra.
40. The property concept has been used to explain why the right to the pecuniary
value of a famous name or likeness may be assigned even though rights of privacy are
not assignable. See Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205, 1206 (8th Cir. 1969);
Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn. 1970).
41. 202 F.2d at 868.
42. Prosser, supra note 6, at 406.
43. See text accompanying notes 67-69 infra.
44. One commentator has insisted that "in the light of the state of the law in this
field, the tag 'property' becomes material as furnishing a firm basis for distinguishing
between claims which have a solid pecuniary worth and those involving injured feel-
ings." Gordon, supra note 17, at 606-07.
45. See notes 99-100 & accompanying text infra.
46. A 1958 attempt in a California federal district court elicited the following
response: "This Court does not feel it wishes to blaze the trail to establish in Cali-
fornia a cause of action based upon the right of publicity." Strickler v. National
Broadcasting Co., 167 F. Supp. 68, 70 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
47. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
The court held that although the driver's facial features were not visible, the car was
recognizable as the plaintiff's, so that he was identifiable as its driver. Id. at 827.
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only determine that they would recognize such an interest and
protect it.
48
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures presented the California appellate courts
with the opportunity to afford legal protection to the pecuniary in-
terest in famous names and likenesses and to recognize that the right
of publicity may descend to a person's heirs.
Adjudication of the Descent Issue
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures: The Trial Court DecisionY9
Bela Lugosi played the title role in the 1931 motion picture
Dracula, produced by Universal Pictures' predecessor corporation, Uni-
versal Pictures Company, Inc. The film has continued to have wide
appeal over the years and has been re-released and broadcast over
television many times. Lugosi died in 1956.
Beginning in 1960, Universal Pictures sold licenses for the manu-
facture of numerous consumer items bearing Lugosi's likeness in his
role as Count Dracula. 0 Lugosi's son and widow sued Universal in
1966, alleging that they had inherited Lugosi's exclusive right to exploit
the commercial value of his likeness as Count Dracula.51 Universal's
appropriation of Lugosi's likeness through the sale of merchandising
licenses was alleged to be an invasion of that inherited right.5
2
Judge Bernard S. Jefferson, the trial judge, issued a written opinion
in 1972. The opinion contained a lengthy discussion of the nature of
the right of publicity. The court began its discussion by ratifying
48. Id. at 825-26.
49. 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 541 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972), rev'd, 70 Cal. App. 3d
552, modified, 71 Cal. App. 3d 1027a, as modified, 139 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1977), petition
for hearing granted, Civil No. L.A. 30824 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Aug. 11, 1977).
50. "Universal issued merchandising licenses to manufacture and sell the follow-
ing products containing Lugosi's photoplay appearance as Count Dracula: child pho-
nograph records; plastic toy pencil sharpeners; greeting cards and talking greeting cards;
model plastic figures; T-shirts, sweat shirts and patches; jump picture rings and pins;
monster old-maid card games; soap and detergent products; Halloween costumes and
masks; casting and enlargograph sets and kits; target games and sets; picture puzzles;
mechanical walking toys; ink-on transfers; trading cards; Halloween candy and gum;
small comic books; self-erasing magic slates; punch-out novelty mask books; cutout
paper dolls and books; monster mansion vehicles; wax figurines; candy dispensers; rub-
ber masks; transparencies; kites, calendars and prints; plastic sliding square puzzle games;
children's and ladies' jewelry, belts and belt buckles; wall plaques; wallets; juvenile
luggage; biking buddies; animated flip books; campaign type buttons; photo printing
kits; advertising campaigns; stirring rods and spoons; toy horoscope viewers with flip
cards." Petition for Hearing, at 11 n.4, Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, Civil No. L.A.
30824 (Cal. Sup. Ct., filed July 19, 1977) (citation omitted).
51. A prior suit, initiated in 1963, had been dismissed by the plaintiffs pursuant
to the reopening of the probate of Lugosi's estate.
52. 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 541-42.
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Judge Frank's statement in Haelan that the property label is immaterial
to recognition of the right of publicity;53 the Haelan approach was
declared to be "eminently sound."54  Nevertheless, the opinion then
lapsed into the "property" rationale it had sought to avoid. Three
right of publicity cases 5 were cited as authority for "the better view
. . . that a celebrity's interest in his name, appearance, likeness and
personality which has a publicity pecuniary value, should be con-
sidered a property right separate and apart from the right of privacy
.... -56 The court then utilized its property characterization as a
rationale for descent: "It is this court's holding that Bela Lugosi's
interest or right in his likeness and appearance as Count Dracula was
a property right of such character and substance that it did not ter-
minate with his death but descended to his heirs."57 Following an
accounting, the plaintiffs were awarded damages based on Universal's
profits from the licensing agreements, and an injunction against future
licensing without their consent was issued.58
Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc."9
In the interim between adjudication of Lugosi at the trial level
53. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
54. 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 545-46.
55. 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 546 (citing Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205 (8th
Cir. 1969)); Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D.
Minn. 1970). For a discussion of the cited cases, see notes 36-40 & accompanying
text supra.
56. 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 548-49 (emphasis in original).
57. Id. at 551. The court also decided the following: (1) although in his 1931
contract for the production of Dracula Lugosi had assigned to Universal the right to
exploit his likeness in connection with the film, this assignment extended only to use
directly related to the advertising and exploitation of the motion picture, id. at 543-44;
(2) the licensing of the Count Dracula character as played by Lugosi amounted to
an appropriation of Lugosi's own likeness, id. at 549-50; and (3) the applicable statute
of limitation was the two year limit set forth in California Code of Civil Procedure
§ 339(1) for actions for liability not founded upon an instrument in writing and was
tolled upon commencement of the 1966 suit, id. at 551-56.
58. Plaintiffs recovered damages in the sum of $52,023.23, plus $19,970.63 pre-
judgment interest. Petition for Hearing, at 14, Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, Civil No.
L.A. 30824 (Cal. Sup. Ct., filed July 19, 1977).
One court, in discussing the measure of damages for an appropriation, suggested
that actual profit is merely indicative, rather than determinative, of the value of an
appropriated right of publicity. Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co., 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
314, 321-23 (Pa. C.P. 1957). A low profit margin may reflect poor business manage-
ment rather than low publicity value. Thus, a measure of damages based upon a
percentage of the manufacturer's gross receipts might more accurately reflect publicity
value.
59. 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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and in the court of appeal, a New York federal district court held
that the right of publicity is descendible. In Price v. Hal Roach
Studios, Inc., an action had been brought by the widows of Laurel
and Hardy and a corporation to whom Hardy's widow and Laurel had
granted exclusive rights to exploit the actors' names and likenesses.60
Following the plaintiffs' grant of exclusive rights, defendant Roach,
the producer of the Laurel and Hardy films, executed an assignment
of merchandising rights in the names and likenesses of Laurel and
Hardy.01 The plaintiffs charged that the Roach assignment was an
invasion of publicity rights which had descended to plaintiffs as the
heirs of Laurel and Hardy.
62
In holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to injunctive relief
and damages, Price joined the cases that recognize that, "[w]hile much
confusion is generated by the notion that the right of publicity ema-
nates from the classic right of privacy, the two rights are clearly
separable. " 63  The right of privacy, explained the court, prevents in-
jury to feelings, whereas the right of publicity is of a "purely commer-
cial nature." 4  As in the Lugosi trial court opinion, 5 an understanding
of this dichotomy enabled the court to find that the right of publicity
is descendible.06
Price noted that the right of publicity has been recognized as a
"property" right but, unlike the Lugosi trial court, 7 did not set forth
the proprietary attributes of the right as a rationale for its descendi-
bility. The court instead found that "[t]here appears to be no logical
reason to terminate this right upon death of the person protected.
It is for this reason, presumably, that this publicity right has been
deemed a 'property right."' 8 The court thus bestowed a property
label on the right in recognition that there is no reason for its termina-
60. The corporation produced films and licensed toys and games. Id. at 838.
61. In contractual clauses similar to that in Lugosi (see note 57 supra), Laurel
and Hardy had assigned to Roach the right to expoit their names and likenesses in
connection with advertising and exploiting their films. The Price court reached the
same conclusion as that reached in Lugosi: the assignments were restricted to such
use. Id. at 839-42.
62. Id. at 839.
63. Id. at 843.
64. Id. at 844.
65. The Price court cited Judge Jefferson's Lugosi opinion as authority for its
holding. Id. at 844-45.
66. "In arguing for termination of the right, defendants appear to confuse the two
essentially different concepts, that is, the traditional right of privacy which clearly
terminates upon death of the person asserting such a right and the right of publicity
which we think does not terminate upon death." Id. at 844.
67. See text accompanying notes 53-57 supra.
68. 400 F. Supp. at 844.
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tion on the celebrity's death, thereby placing the function of the label
in proper perspective.6 9
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures: The Appellate Court Decision
Two years after Price, the decision of the Lugosi trial court was
reversed by the California court of appeal. The appellate court char-
acterized the "so-called right of publicity"70 as a form of privacy in-
vasion. Various segments of the opinion alluded to Prosser's character-
ization of the right against appropriation of name or likeness as one
of four types of privacy invasion71 and noted that the right of privacy
is persona 7 2 and "dies with the person."73
69. Price also considered an argument that Laurel and Hardy had lost their rights
of publicity through nonuse. The court's response was that this idea is "nonsensical,"
because they were protected during periods of nonuse by the law of privacy. Id. at
846. The Lugosi appellate court held, however, that Lugosi's right of publicity was
not descendible because it was not "exercised" during his lifetime. See notes 81-84
& accompanying text infra.
The descent issue reappeared in New York recently in Factors Etc. v. Creative
Card, No. 77 Civ. 4400 (CHT) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 1977). Two days following the
death of Elvis Presley, Factors Etc. acquired rights to expoit the singer's likeness; the
assignor had acquired those rights prior to Presley's death. The parties to the assign-
ment sought to restrain the defendants from manufacturing and selling posters and
other merchandise bearing the Presley likeness. The court granted a preliminary in-
junction, holding that Presley's right of publicity was descendible and therefore as-
signable after his death. The court cited the Price holding that the right of publicity
is descendible notwithstanding "nonuse." The court also, however, explained its hold-
ing by noting that Presley's right of publicity was "clearly exercised by and financially
benefiting Elvis Presley in life;" the holding was thus declared to be consistent with
the view that an unexercised right of publicity is not descendible. Id. at 12 (emphasis
in original). See notes 81-84 & accompanying text infra. That the court offered this
rationale in addition to citing Price is unfortunate, because the two views, descent
regardless of nonuse as opposed to descent due to exercise, cannot be reconciled.
70. 71 Cal. App. 3d at 1027b, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 40 n.8.
71. 70 Cal. App. 3d at 557, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 38. See note 16 supra.
72. Id. at 557-58, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
73. Id. at 559, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 39 (quoting Hendrickson v. California News-
papers, Inc., 48 Cal. App. 3d 59, 62, 121 Cal. Rptr. 429, 431 (1975). In noting that
the right of privacy is personal, the court discussed three cases that had denied prop-
erty-oriented appropriation claims by heirs. Id. at 558, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 39. It was
implied that these decisions supported the holding that the right of publicity is not
descendible. These cases, however, do not in fact support such a holding. In the
first case mentioned, Maritote v. Desilu Productions, Inc., 345 F.2d 418 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 883 (1965), the defendant had produced a film about the late
Al Capone. The court held that Capone's widow and son could not recover for their
pain and suffering caused by a so-called invasion of the deceased Capone's privacy.
A cause of action pleaded by Capone's administratrix for unjust enrichment through
appropriation of a "property right" was declared to be irrelevant to the privacy ques-
tion; its merits were not discussed. In the third case cited by the Lugosi appellate
court, James v. Screen Gems, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 2d 650, 344 P.2d 799 (1959), the
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The Lugosi appellate court followed Judge Frank and Dean
Prosser in dismissing the property label as "pointless."7 4  Like the
Price court, it saw the need to seek other bases for resolving the de-
scent issue. The court's basic premise was that the right asserted by
Lugosi's heirs did not descend to them because, as a "'right of value'
to create a business, product or service of value," it was protected only
by the personal right of privacy.75 Because Lugosi had never exer-
cised his right to exploit the commercial value of his likeness as Count
Dracula, he had not converted his "right of value" into a "thing of
value."71 His right of value was characterized as an unexercised op-
portunity, which, the court intimated, should not be descendible.
77
Scant explanation was offered as to why opportunity should not be
descendible. The court suggested that the decision to exploit the op-
portunities presented by the publicity value of name or likeness is
a personal one and should belong only to Lugosi.78 The specter of
unlimited descent was also implied.79 Finally, the court stated that
"neither society's interest in the free dissemination of ideas nor the
artist's rights to the fruits of his own labor would be served" by
descent.80
In arguments before the appellate court plaintiffs cited as au-
thority for descent, several cases in which the right of publicity was
plaintiff claimed that she was entitled to compensation for defendant's motion picture
exploitation of the personality of her deceased husband, Jesse James, Jr. She had,
however, alleged an invasion of her privacy, so that the court was able to deny her
claim simply because she herself had not been depicted in the film. The Lugosi trial
court noted that James was an injury to feelings case rather than a right of publicity
case. 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 548.
The second case cited by the Lugosi appellate court, Schumann v. Loew's, Inc.,
135 N.Y.S.2d 361 (Sup. Ct. 1954), final amended complaint dismissed, 144 N.Y.S.2d
27 (Sup. Ct. 1955), is the only one in which descent of the right of publicity was di-
rectly considered. Great-grandchildren of Robert Schumann contended that the de-
fendant's film depicting the life of the composer constituted an appropriation of a de-
scendible property right. The court did not expressly reject the property theory but
held for the defendant because it could find no support for a rule of descent when,
as in this case, the ancestor had been dead for nearly one hundred years. The plain-
tiffs, moreover, had not shown that they were Schumann's legal heirs. Lugosi is dis-
tinguishable in that the appropriation occurred only four years after Lugosi's death
and the heirship of the plaintiffs was established. See notes 130-42 & accompanying
text infra.
74. 70 Cal. App. 3d at 556, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 37-38.
75. Id. at 556, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
76. Id. See notes 85-86 & accompanying text infra.
77. Id. at 559, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 40.
78. Id. at 559, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 39. See note 90 infra.
79. Id. at 559, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 40. See notes 129-42 & accompanying text
infra.
80. Id. at 560, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 40.
held to be assignable."' The court's response was that "assign-
ment of the right . . . is synonymous with its exercise." 2  As
Lugosi had not "exercised" his right, either through assignment or
direct exploitation, his name and likeness were held to have passed
into the public domain upon his death.83  "[A]nyone, related or un-
related to Lugosi, with the imagination, the enterprise, the energy and
the cash" could exploit the publicity value of the Lugosi name and
likeness.
84
The appellate court opinion left unanswered the question whether
an exercised right of publicity is descendible. If the California courts
ultimately give this question a positive answer, subsidiary questions
will arise, such as whether a given form of exercise creates a descend-
ible right encompassing all other types of exercise and what is meant
by the term "exercise."
The paramount question is whether the right of publicity descends
when it has been exercised. The court's only positive statement re-
garding descent was that, if Lugosi had exploited his likeness by
establishing a business with great public acceptance or good will, this
"property" could have descended to his heirs but that descent "depends
entirely on how [the business] was managed before Lugosi died."
5
This statement was actually nothing more than a recognition that an
established business may be passed to heirs and may be protected by
the law of unfair competition. 6  The court distinguished Lugosi from
81. Id. at 560, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 40 (citing Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205
(8th Cir. 1969); Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d
866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F.
Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970)).
82. Id. at 560, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 40. This point was underscored in a modifica-
tion of the opinion after the plaintiffs had cited Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. in a
petition for rehearing. The court denied the petition and modified its opinion in order
to distinguish Price as an "exercise through assignment" case. The modification stated
that "assignment is in all respects a personal assertion of the right of publicity. This
is not the case when an heir is invested by operation of law with the opportunity to
exercise a personal right which was never exercised by the person who owned and
controlled those rights." 71 Cal. App. 3d at 1027b n.8, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 40.
83. 70 Cal. App. 3d at 560, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 40.
84. Id. at 559, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 40. The Lugosi appellate court reaffirmed its po-
sition on the descendibility of the right of publicity three months later in Guglielni v.
Spelling-Goldberg Prod., 73 Cal. App. 3d 436, 140 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1977), in which the
defendants bad produced and exhibited a film about the late Rudolph Valentino. The
same rationales discussed in Lugosi were asserted to support the holding that the right
to exploit the name and likeness of a famous person is personal. See notes 119-22
& accompanying text infra.
85. 70 Cal. App. 3d at 557, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 38. The court's only example of
how "management" might result in descendible property was that Lugosi could have
sold such a business for installment payments due after his death. Id.
86. See note 31 supra.
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Price on the basis that Laurel and Hardy had personally asserted their
rights through assignment7 but indicated neither approval nor dis-
approval of the result reached in that case. Whether the Lugosi court
would have found that an "exercised" right of publicity is descendible
remains unclear.
If California courts recognize descent of an exercised right of
publicity, a question would arise as to the scope of the descended right.
Would exploitation of a person's name or likeness in one manner result
in descent of a right of publicity encompassing all other types of ex-
ploitation? 88 The Lugosi court's answer, apparently, would be no.
Lugosi had "exercised" his right of publicity in 1931, insofar as he
had assigned to Universal the right to use his name and likeness for
the limited purpose of advertising and exploiting the Dracula film.89
Despite this assignment, the court held that his heirs did not have any
vested rights regarding the licenses later granted to toy and novelty
companies by Universal. The scope of the descendible right created
by Lugosi's exercise was restricted to the type of use for which he
had assigned the right to exploit his name and likeness.
A consequence of such a limitation is that a celebrity cannot pre-
serve rights related to types of exploitation that are not feasible during
his or her own lifetime. The Lugosi appellate court wrongly assumed
that nonexercise of the right of publicity is equivalent to a choice never
to exercise the right.9° A celebrity may in fact wish to exploit his
or her name or likeness for both personal benefit and the benefit of
heirs and yet, as a practical matter, be forced to wait until his or her
name and likeness have attained their optimum publicity value. This
point may not be reached in the celebrity's lifetime but rather may
be brought about by death. The anomalous result is that, although
the Lugosi court favored allowing persons to choose whether to create
descendible property through systematic exercise of the right of pub-
icity,91 the celebrity might in reality have no choice. If premature
exploitation were forced, the full commercial potential of name and
likeness might never be realized.
87. 71 Cal. App. 3d at 1027b n.8, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 40. Note, however, that only
Laurel had assigned his right of publicity. Hardy was deceased; his widow had joined
with Laurel in the assignment. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
88. For example, if Lugosi had manufactured or licensed the manufacture of like-
ness-bearing sweat shirts, would his heirs have acquired rights to produce likeness-
bearing beer mugs?
89. 70 Cal. App. 3d at 560, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 40. See note 57 supra.
90. The court stated that "lilt is not at all unlikely that Lugosi and others in his
position did not during their respective lifetimes exercise their undoubted right to
capitalize upon their personalites ... for reasons of taste or judgment or because the
enterprise to be organized might be too demanding or simply because they did not
want to be bothered." Id. at 559, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
91. See text accompanying note 78 supra.
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A final question is what constitutes the exercise that results in a
descendible right of publicity. The Lugosi court left this question
partially unanswered, restricting its discussion to exercise through as-
signment or creation of a business and to the legal effect of nonuse.
No answers were provided as to the possibility of exercise in other
ways, for example engaging in or ratifying a minor or token business
enterprise. 92  The use of the term "exercise" without accompanying
definition or explanation contributes more uncertainty to an area of
the law already fraught with confusion.
The Lugosi court failed to perceive that the relevance of the law
of unfair competition to the right of publicity is limited. Whereas
Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. noted that the right of publicity is
similar to a commercial enterprise's rights in any secondary meaning
attached to its name,93 the Lugosi appellate court went much further
than analogy. It stressed that Lugosi's name and likeness were pro-
tected solely by the personal right of privacy because he had never
used them in connection with a business so as to create secondary
meaning protectible under the law of unfair competition. 94  Treatment
of the plaintiffs' claim in this manner enabled the court to find that
Lugosi's right to the pecuniary value of his name and likeness did not
descend to his heirs. This application of the law of unfair competition
and the right of privacy was inapposite, however, for neither type of
legal protection adequately safeguards the right of publicity.95
The appellate court's ultimate explanation of its decision was that
it is "rather novel to urge that because one's immediate ancestor did
not exploit the flood of publicity and/or other evidence of public ac-
ceptance he received in his lifetime for commercial purposes, the op-
portunity to have done so is property which descends to his heirs."9 6
Descent of an exploitation opportunity is in fact not novel at all. For
example, copyright law has long made descendible protection avail-
able to unpublished works.9 7 Heirs may thus acquire the exclusive
92. For example, if Lugosi had manufactured three hundred likeness-bearing sweat
shirts in 1950 and none thereafter, would an exclusive right to this type of exploitation
descend to his heirs? If an assignment constitutes an "exercise," would a specific be-
quest of the right to exploit one's name and likeness similarly constitute a "personal
assertion" of the right of publicity? See note 82 supra.
93. 400 F. Supp. at 843 n.4. See note 31 supra.
94. In other words, he had established no business that would have been inter-
fered with by Universal's licensing. 70 Cal. App. 3d at 555-56, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
95. See notes 22-24, 31 & accompanying text supra.
96. 70 Cal. App. 3d at 559, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 40.
97. The Copyright Act of 1976 treats all works the same, whether or not pub-
lished; the general rule is that a copyright lasts for a term consisting of the life of
the author and fifty years after his or her death. 17 U.S.C.A. § 302 (West Supp. Ap-
pendix 1977).
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opportunity to exploit, through publication, a decedent's previously
unpublished work.
The court's policy rationales for termination are similarly without
support. The court assumed that an unexercised right of publicity
should be considered personal because "neither society's interest in
the free dissemination of ideas nor the artist's rights to the fruits of
his own labor would be served" by descent.98 No explanation was
provided to support this assumption or to show how society's interest
is different if the celebrity had exercised his publicity rights. The
court neither anticipated nor acknowledged the policy arguments in
favor of descent.
Policy Bases for a Descendible Right of Publicity
The Lugosi trial court99 and several commentators'"° have argued
that the right of publicity should be descendible because it is a property
right. Their argument is that, if name and likeness are property, they,
like other forms of property, should be capable of succession as well
as inter vivos transfer. As Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. indicated,
however, the appropriate function of the property label is to emphasize
that the right ought to descend, rather than to rationalize descent. 1 1
Once the determination is made that the right of publicity should de-
scend, 0 2 the right may be characterized as proprietary.
The most obvious reason for descent is that famous names and
likenesses, because of their potential commercial worth, 08 are clearly
"things of value."'1 4  As a recent New York case declared, the celeb-
rity "must be considered as having invested years of practice and
competition in a public personality which eventually may reach mar-
ketable status." 0 5 Licenses to exploit a name or likeness that has
98. 70 Cal. App. 3d at 560, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 40.
99. See text accompanying notes 53-57 supra.
100. Gordon, supra note 17, at 599; Sobel, Count Dracula and the Right of Publicity,
47 L.A.B. BULL. 373, 378, 399-401 (1972); Note, The Right of Publicity - Protection
for Public Figures and Celebrities, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 527, 546 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Protection for Public Figures]; Comment, Transfer of the Right of Publicity:
Dracula's Progeny and Privacy's Stepchild, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1103, 1117 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Dracula's Progeny].
101. See text accompanying notes 67-69 supra.
102. The Price rationale for descent was simply that there are no reasons for ter-
mination. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
103. See note 1 & accompanying text supra.
104. The Lugosi appellate court characterized Lugosi's exclusive right to name and
likeness during his lifetime as "'a right of value,' which could have been transmuted
into things of value." 70 Cal. App. 3d at 556, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 38. The court did
not recognize that, in addition to a right of value to exploit his likeness, Lugosi pos-
sessed a marketable thing of value, the likeness itself.
105. Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Urban Sys., Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 788, 790, 340
achieved marketable status are commonly purchased; the business
community has recognized the great value of famous names and
likenesses.100
Descent of the right of publicity would assist in enabling a celeb-
rity to enjoy a fundamental benefit of his labor, the personal satisfac-
tion derived from creating an estate for his family. A rule of descent
would therefore serve "the artist's rights to the fruits of his own la-
bor," notwithstanding the Lugosi appellate court's assumption to the
contrary. 1
0 7
An important policy consideration may be advanced in favor of
descent of the right of publicity by analogy with the purpose of patent
and copyright laws. Intellectual property is protected under patent
and copyright laws pursuant to "the conviction that encouragement
of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and
useful Arts."-'108  In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,1
0 9
the United States Supreme Court declared that the right of publicity
has the same purpose. The Court stated that the decision to protect
a performer's right of publicity "rests on more than a desire to com-
pensate the performer for the time and effort invested in his act; the
protection provides an economic incentive for him to make the invest-
ment required to produce a performance of interest to the public."
10
Descent of the right of publicity would contribute to that incentive.
Assurance that the exclusive right to exploit name and likeness will
inure to the benefit of heirs will provide the celebrity with further
impetus to contribute to his or her profession. The incentive will be
even greater when the celebrity is advanced in years or when name
and likeness do not reach their optimum publicity value during his
or her lifetime."'
These reasons for descent of the right of publicity support the
bestowing of the "property" label, which courts often find expedient
to an understanding and explanation of the nature of the right of
publicity.
N.Y.S.2d 144, 146 (Sup. Ct.), afJ'd as modified, 42 App. Div. 2d 544, 345 N.Y.S.2d
17 (1973). See also Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises, Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72, 79, 232
A.2d 458, 462 (1967).
106. See note 1 & accompanying text supra.
107. See note 80 & accompanying text supra.
108. Zacchini v. Scrippsr-Howard Broadcasting Co., 97 S. Ct. 2849, 2858 (1977)
(quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)).
109. 97 S. Ct. 2849 (1977).
110. Id. at 2857.
111. See text accompanying notes 90-91 supra.
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The Right of Publicity and the Dissemination of Information
Courts generally have agreed that the right of publicity cannot
restrict the use of names and likenesses with respect to dissemination
of information and ideas, which is protected by the first amendment.112
For example, the publication of a person's name or likeness in a news
report is not actionable as an invasion of the right of publicity. This
protection "arises out of the desire and the right of the public to know
what is going on in the world, and the freedom of the press and other
agencies of information to tell them.""13  It encompasses not only
news regarding current events but also the dissemination of informa-
tion, entertainment, and discussion of "interesting phases of human
activity in generar' in books, articles, pictures, films, and radio and
television broadcasts. 1 4  The nonconsensual use of a famous person's
name and likeness in such vehicles of information as biographies and
motion picture documentaries is thus permissible. That the impetus
for such use may be the potential for profit rather than a philanthropic
desire to contribute to the public enlightenment is of slight significance,
because the profit motive is the driving force behind much dissemina-
tion of information." 5
The Lugosi appellate court alluded to the possibility of a conflict
between a descendible right of publicity and society's interest in the
free dissemination of ideas." 6  The court did not explain, however,
why a descendible right of publicity would differ from a personal right
of publicity in regard to interplay with the first amendment. Univer-
sal Pictures' use of Lugosi's likeness, moreover, cannot be considered
speech or expression. The use of a famous name or likeness to em-
bellish consumer products conveys neither information nor ideas and
contributes virtually nothing to the public enlightenment.117 Such
112. "Just as a public figure's 'right of privacy' must yield to the public interest
so too must the 'right of publicity' bow where such conflicts with the free dissemination
of thoughts, ideas, newsworthy events, and matters of public interest." Rosemont
Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d 1, 6, 294 N.Y.S.2d 122, 129
(Sup. Ct. 1968), aff'd mem., 32 App. Div. 2d 892, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1969). See,
e.g., Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 444, 447-48, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501,
506 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (dissemination of information does not constitute use "for purposes
of trade" within meaning of New York privacy statute).
113. Prosser, supra note 6, at 412.
114. Id. at 413. See Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 444, 448,
299 N.Y.S.2d 501, 506 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
115. W. PaossER, LAw or TonTs 806-07 (4th ed. 1971). See Gordon, supra note
17, at 574.
116. See note 80 & accompanying text supra.
117. By contrast, one court has found that the publication of a poster bearing the
likeness of a comedian engaged in a satirical presidential campaign is constitutionally
protected. The court explained that the use of likeness was related to a matter of
use, furthermore, is distinguishable from commercial expression, such
as pharmaceutical advertising, which proposes a transaction rather
than decorating a product.118 The relevance of society's interest
in the free dissemination of information, contrary to the Lugosi ap-
pellate court's assumption, is at best nominal when name or likeness
is used to embellish consumer products, regardless of whether the
right of publicity is deemed to be personal or descendible.
Cases such as Lugosi, involving consumer products, must be
distinguished from those right of publicity cases that involve use of
a name or likeness in motion picture and television biographies. A
recent example of the latter is Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Produc-
tions," 9 decided three months after Lugosi by the same court. In
Guglielmi the nephew of Rudolph Valentino sued the defendants for
their production and exhibition of a film about the life of the late
silent film star. The trial court sustained a demurrer. On appeal the
plaintiff asserted that he had inherited an exclusive right to exploit
the commercial value of Valentino's identity and that the defendants
had invaded this right by exhibiting a fictionalized film biography of
Valentino. The appellate court indicated, however, that the film con-
stituted protected first amendment expression, 20 and reiterated its
Lugosi holding, declaring that society's interest in the free dissemina-
tion of information and ideas would be frustrated by the recognition
of a descendible right of publicity.121  The allegation that the film
was fictional was not discussed in the opinion.
The Guglielmi case, unlike Lugosi, involves the use of name and
likeness in the dissemination of biographical information, so that the
first amendment limitation on the right of publicity must be con-
sidered. The thrust of the plaintiff's argument in Guglielmi was that
the film biography of Valentino did not merit first amendment pro-
tection because it was fictionalized. An analogous theory appeared
in a fictional biography case adjudicated under the New York law of
privacy, in which the court declared, "The factual reporting of news-
worthy persons and events is in the public interest and is protected.
The fictitious is not." 12 2  This argument, that first amendment pro-
public interest rather than the mere sale of a commodity. Paulsen v. Personality
Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 444, 450-51, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501, 508-09 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
118. Pharmaceutical advertising as a form of commercial expression was recently
afforded first amendment protection in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); see Note, The Constitutional
Status of Commercial Expression, 3 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 761 (1976).
119. 73 Cal. App. 3d 436, 140 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1977), petition for hearing granted,
Civil No. L.A. 30872 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Nov. 14, 1977).
120. Id. at 442, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 778.
121. Id. at 442-43, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 778-79.
122. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324, 328, 221 N.E.2d 543, 545, 274
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tection is lost when the biography of a deceased person is fictional-
ized for commercial purposes, is tenuous at best. Serious difficulties
may arise in determining at what point dramatization, speculation,
or deviation from the truth renders a biography fictional.
123
The most recent judicial comment on the role of the first amend-
ment in right of publicity cases appears in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 24 involving the television broadcast of the plaintiff's
"entire act," a fifteen-second human cannonball performance. The
United States Supreme Court held in Zacchini that the first amendment
does not prevent a state from finding the broadcast of an entire act to
be an invasion of the performer's right of publicity, 125 notwithstanding
the conveyance of information of public interest. The Court indicated
that its holding did not restrict the free dissemination of information,
implying that the defendant could have conveyed the same information
N.Y.S.2d 877, 879, vacated per curiam, 387 U.S. 239, aff'd on rehearing, 21 N.Y.2d
124, 233 N.E.2d 840, 286 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 1046
(1969). Justice Powell, dissenting in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.
suggests that use of name or likeness that is a "subterfuge or cover for private or
commercial exploitation" should be held an invasion of the right of publicity. 97 S.
Ct. 2849, 2860 (1977); see Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Urban Systems, Inc., 72 Misc.
2d 788, 340 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd as modified, 42 App. Div. 2d 544, 345
N.Y.S.2d 17 (App. Div. 1973) (game exploiting the personality of Howard Hughes
an invasion of privacy despite the conveyance of biographical information); Palmer v.
Schonhorn Enterprises, Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72, 232 A.2d 458 (1967) (use of bi-
ographies of professional golfers in board game an invasion of privacy).
123. Two New York privacy cases have stated that, regarding motion pictures, the
mere dramatization of actual events is not in itself actionable; there must be some
element of fiction. Molony v. Boy Comics Publishers, 277 App. Div. 166, 171, 98
N.Y.S.2d 119, 123 (App. Div. 1950); Youssoupoff v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc.,
41 Misc. 2d 42, 44-47, 244 N.Y.S.2d 701, 704-06, aff'd mem., 19 App. Div. 2d 865,
244 N.Y.S.2d 1 (App. Div. 1963), motion for dismissal & directed verdict denied,
48 Misc. 2d 700, 265 N.Y.S.2d 754 (Sup. Ct. 1965). But see Gordon, supra note 17,
at 584-85 (equating dramatization with fictionalization). Several privacy cases have
indicated that a minor deviation from the truth may not be sufficient to transform a
publication into fiction. See Youssoupoff v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 41 Misc.
2d 42, 244 N.Y.S.2d 701, aff'd mem., 19 App. Div. 2d 865, 244 N.Y.S.2d 1 (App. Div.
1963), motion for dismissal & directed verdict denied, 48 Misc. 2d 700, 265 N.Y.S.2d
754 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (films); Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne, & Heath, Inc., 188 Misc.
470, 68 N.Y.S.2d 770 (Sup. Ct.), aft'd, 272 App. Div. 759, 69 N.Y.S.2d 433 (App.
Div. 1947) (books).
One commentator has noted that liability for appropriation of name or likeness
through the publication of a false biography of a public figure would require, in ac-
cordance with constitutional demands, that the defendant knew of the falsity or reck-
lessly disregarded it. Protection for Public Figures, supra note 100, at 553-54. See
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (requiring "actual malice" for liability in
"false light" privacy cases); Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 124, 233 N.E.2d
840, 280 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 1046 (1969).
124. 97 S. Ct. 2849 (1977).
125. Id.
by staging its own human cannonball act.126  An "entire act" 2 ' ap-
propriation may thus be within the scope of a state's law of publicity
if the concept or idea behind the act can be conveyed in another
way.128  Zacchini may have implications that go beyond its holding.
The case suggests a requirement that any appropriation must be
avoided if the underlying idea can be effectively conveyed in some
alternative manner without diminishing the pecuniary value of name
and likeness.
The Duration of Descent
Judicial recognition of a descendible right of publicity will raise
serious questions concerning the duration of its protection. In this
respect the apprehension of the Lugosi appellate court129 was justi-
fiable because unlimited descent would be impractical, unnecessary,
and in some cases absurd.
A plethora of suits by distant descendants of historical figures
could result from a rule of unlimited descent. In an illustrative case,
Schumann v. Loew's Inc., 30 great-grandchildren of Robert Schumann
unsuccessfully contended that a film dramatization of the composer's
life violated a property right that had descended to them. The court
did not take issue with the property cases cited by the plaintiffs but
emphasized the great length of time, nearly one hundred years, be-
tween Schumann's death and the lawsuit.'13  A related opinion, dis-
missing an amended complaint in the same suit, noted the absurd
possibility of suits by the descendants of Shakespeare, Jefferson, and
Voltaire, if the Schumann descendants were to prevail.
132
The Schumann court rested its decision on the basis that the
plaintiffs had shown only that they were descendants and not that
they were legal heirs. 133  This point has led several commentators to
suggest, in advocating a rule of unlimited descent, that the difficulties
in proving legal heirship would reduce the threat of frivolous suits
126. Id. at 2858 n.13.
127. Justice Powell dissenting in Zacchini, states that in future cases involving
different performances it may be difficult to determine just what constitutes an "entire
act." Id. at 2859 n.1.
128. Id. at 2858 n.13. This concept is based upon Professor Nimmer's explanation
as to why copyright law does not abridge the first amendment: copyright law allows
others to restate an author's ideas, protecting only the author's own expression of those
ideas. 1 M. NImMER, NIMMIER ON CopyRIGHT 28.11-.16 (1976).
129. See text accompanying note 79 supra.
130. 135 N.Y.S.2d 361 (Sup. Ct. 1954), final amended complaint dismissed, 144
N.Y.S.2d 27 (Sup. Ct. 1955). See note 73 supra.
131. 135 N.Y.S.2d at 368-69.
132. 144 N.Y.S.2d at 30.
133. 135 N.Y.S.2d at 368-69.
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by distant descendants. 34  Even if proof of heirship is perceived as
an obstacle, however, the deterrent contributes nothing toward alle-
viating the uncertainty and confusion that a rule of unlimited descent
would generate. Difficulties in proving heirship might hopelessly com-
plicate litigation rather than prevent it. Those persons who wished
to exploit the name or likeness of an historical figure would be faced
with the dubious task of determining whether there were any heirs
with whom negotiations would be necessary.
There is no compelling reason for unlimited descent because the
strength of the rationale supporting a descendible right of publicity
diminishes with the passage of years. Estates are generally intended
for those persons who were alive during the decedent's lifetime and
would be expected to survive his or her death. Descent of the right
of publicity to persons born decades or centuries later would not serve
as additional incentive for the celebrity to contribute to his or her
profession.13
5
A reasonable durational limit on descent of the right of publicity
can be drawn from an analogy to copyright law. Under the Copy-
right Act of 1976, the general duration of copyright protection has
been extended to a term consisting of the author's lifetime plus fifty
years after his or her death. 3 6  The House Committee on the Judiciary
explained that one reason for the change was a substantial increase
in life expectancy, rendering the extension necessary in order to pro-
vide adequate protection for the author and his or her dependents.3a
The ultimate purpose of such protection is to encourage literary efforts
and thereby "advance public welfare through the talents of authors."138
Descent of the right .of publicity has a similar rationale. 3 9 A right
of publicity which lasts for a period of life plus fifty years will generally
parallel the life spans of close heirs, so that the interest in encouraging
a celebrity to contribute to his or her profession will be adequately
served.140  A longer term of protection would be cumbersome and is
unnecessary. 141
134. See Gordon, supra note 17, at 601; Sobel, Count Dracula and the Right of
Publicity, 47 L.A.B. BULL. 373, 403-04 (1972); Protection for Public Figures, supra
note 100, at 547-48.
135. See text accompanying notes 108-11 supra.
136. 17 U.S.C.A. § 302 (West Supp. Appendix 1977). The previous duration of
a copyright was 28 years, renewable for a second 28 years. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1952)
(amended 1976).
137. H.R. RE P. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 134 (1976).
138. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 97 S. Ct." 2849, 2858 (1977)
(quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)).
139. See text accompanying notes 108-11 supra.
140. See text accompanying notes 108-11 supra.
141. A "life plus fifty years" limit on descent of the right of publicity was sug-
gested in Dracula's Progeny, supra note 100, at 1124-28. The author believed that a
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The adoption of a specific durational limit is, of course, beyond
the scope of judicial authority. If the California Supreme Court re-
verses the Lugosi appellate court decision and recognizes a descendible
right of publicity, subsequent legislative action will be required to
establish reasonable limits on the duration of the descent.142  Conse-
quently, a reversal of the Lugosi holding should be expressly limited
to the facts of that case, reserving the issue of descent beyond one
generation for future legislative or judicial action.
Conclusion
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures presents the California Supreme
Court with the opportunity to remove past confusions and to provide
a coherent rationale for descent of the right of publicity. The Su-
preme Court should reverse the holding of the court of appeal and
uphold the trial court's award of damages and injunctive relief. Sub-
sequent legislation imposing a life plus fifty years limit on descent
of the right of publicity would appropriately complement the Lugosi
adjudication and establish a descendible right with sensible dura-
tional limits.
Jon B. Eisenberg*
durational limit is necessitated by a countervailing free speech interest, comparable
to the free speech interest requiring limits on the duration of copyright protection,
which eventually becomes controlling. Id. at 1124-28. The right of publicity in
Lugosi, however, does not in fact conflict with the free dissemination of news or in-
formation. See notes 112-28 & accompanying text supra. The free speech approach
is not a sufficient basis for establishing durational limits in cases involving consumer
products.
Another commentator has suggested that if durational limits are desired, the limit-
ing of descent to heirs with a specified degree of kinship, such as those no more than
two generations removed, may be adequate to prevent frivolous suits. Protection for
Public Figures, supra note 100, at 549. A durational limit based upon individual life
spans, however, is too variable. Furthermore, uncertainty as to the existence of living
heirs would not be diminished by such a limitation. See text accompanying note 134
supra.
142. A legislative enactment separate from California Civil Code § 3344, see note
13 supra, would help alleviate the present privacy-publicity confusion.
a A.B., 1974, University of California at Irvine. Member, Second Year Class.
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